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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GOLDRING PACKING CO., INC.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
H. & M. CATTLE Co., d/b/a
M. & M. DRESSED BEEF CO.,
and GREAT WE'STERN
PACKING AND CA'TTLE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10091

BRIEF· OF DEFENDANT AND APP'ELLAN·T
GREAT WESTERN PACKING AND
CATTLE COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE NA·T.URE OF THE CASE
This is an action to determine the amount owed
by the Goldring Packing Company to the Gr~at
\\~estern Packing and Cattle Comp·any for killing
8,151 ewes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'T
The Jury found there was an oral contract to
kill the ewes for fifty cents per head, and Judgment
in favor of the Goldring Packing Company and
against Great Western Packing & Cattle Company
in the accounting was made and entered in the sum
of $20,377.50. Thereafter, the lower court denied
the motion of the Great estern Packing & Cattle
Company for a new trial.

'r
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Great Western Packing & Cattle Company
wants the judgment of the lower court Vlacated and
a new trial u·pon the issue of what was the fair and
reasonable value of the service of Great Western
Packing and Cattle Company to Goldring Packing
Company in killing the ewes.
STATE ME NT OF FACTS
During the litigation it was stipulated and
agreed that if Goldring Packing Company obtained
a judgment against H & M Cattle Company, it
would be entitled to a ju·dgment against Great Western Packing and Cattle Company in a like amount.
Hence, the lia·bility of Great Western Packing and
·C attle ·Company is to be determined by 'the liability
of H & M C~attle Company.
1

On October 10, 1961 Goldrin·g Packing Company filed its original complain~t claimin·g it had a
written contract with the H & M Cattle Company
requiring H & M C:attle Company to kill ewes for
50 cents per head, (R. 111). All defendants answered this 'allegation saying the written contract only
required them to kill lambs for fifty cents per head
and did not require them to kill ewes at that price,
( R. 12). In May of 19'63 Goldring Packing Company filed an Amended Complaint again claiming
a written contract to kill ewes for 50 cents per h~ad
( R. 70) . Again the defendants denied the written
contract requiring ewes to be killed for 50 cents per
2
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head. Exhibit 5 is the written contract, and it also
was attacherl to the complaint.
The written contract shows on its face th,at
when it was signed in August of 1961, the parties
changed the word "sheep" to "lambs" and that this
change was noted 'by Max Goldring, president of
the Goldring Packing Company who placed his initials uMG" in the lefthand margin opposite the
name change, and that likewise, the various individual indemnitors, which Goldring P·acking Company required as a condition to ~doing business with
the H & M Cattle Company, also acknowledged the
changing of the word "sheep" to "lambs" in paragraph 2 of the written contract.
At the pretrials i't was agreed by counsel and
the court in January of 1964 that ~ewes were not
lambs (A ewe is a female sheep that has given
birth to a lamb), and the court took the position
that under 'the written contract, Great Western
Packing and Cattle Company was not required to
kill ewes for 50 cents per !head. Thereafter, at the
pretri1al in January of 1964, 2·6 months after the
original law suit was instituted, plaintiff for the
first time introduced the contention that Goldring
Packing Company had an oral contract with H & M
Cattle Company requiring ewes to 'be killed for fifty
cents per head and introduced the is·sue of 1an oral
contract into the law suit. (R. 88). The Amended
Pretrial Order shows tha:t two issue·s were to be
presented. First, there was an issue as to whether
3
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or not there was an oral contract, and second, there
was 1an issue if there was no oral contract, what
was the fair and reason.able value of the services
of Great Western Packing and Cattle Company in
killing 8,151 head of ewes for Goldring Packing
Company (R. 91-92)?
The burden of proving the ortal contract was
on fue Goldring Packing Company, and 'to prove
the alleged oral ·agreement, Mr. Henry Hendler,
the ·general manager of the Goldring Packing ·Company from Los Angeles, California, was called 'as
a witness. Mr. Hendler testified that in May of
1961 he came to Salt Lake from Los Angeles. He
stated (R. 166) that he was invited to come to Salt
l.Jake 'City by Ray McFarland a:t the McFarland
P·acking ·C'Ompany or whatever company was
opera:ting the plant at the time. Mr. Hendler
S'aid he had been requested by Rlay McFarland to
serve on the board of a company (R. 167) to be
organized to take over the operation of the McFarland plant, and he said tha~t in May of 1961 !after
looking over the deal, he decided he did not want
to serve on the board of directors of the company
(R. 169) but that he would like to have the group
kill sheep for ·him ( R. 169) . Mr. Hendler never did
testify ·as to who the group was that he m1ade the
offer to.
In May of 1961 when the alleged conversation
took place at the McFarlan·d plant (R. 168), the
McFarland plant was operated by the McFarland
4
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Packing Company. Ray McFarland, the person to
whom Henry Hendler was speakin·g, was an employee and officer of McFarl1and Packing Co.

M1-. Ray McFarland testified ( R. 203) tha;t a
group was trying to be org1anized to take over
the operation of the plan't. He said the company
or group to be organized was Ralston ~Purina Company, the Goldring Packing ·Company, H & ·M Cattle
Con1pany, Mink, Inc., and McFarlands. He stated
that 1at the time he tall\:ed to Mr. Hendler, he was
representing a group which ·h·ad ndt yet stated a
name ( R. 204) .
'Vhen Great Western Packing and Cattle Company was formed August 4, 1961, Goldring, McFarlands, Ray McF'arland, and Ralston Purin·a were
not a part of the new company. Mr.· McF·arland,
( R. 207) testified that he was not 1an employee of
Great Western or H & ·M, and th·at he was never
hired by either of them to ne·gotiate contracts ( R.
208).
Mr. McFarland said ·at the time he negotiated
the cont1·act with Mr. Hendler in May of l'961, he
bad in mind the group ( R. 206), but 'that ·Great
'\"estern Packing and Cattle Company, McFarlands,
himself, Ralston Purina and Goldring were not a
part of it.
Returning to Mr. Hendler, he testified ·th'at in
May of 1961 he had a convergation with Mr. Ray
jlrFarland at the McFarland plant in Salt Lake
City. Present at the time of thi's conversation were
5
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Mr. Morgan, Mr. Hodson, and Mr. Thayer. Mr.
Hendler said that the entire agreement was made at
the May meeting ( R. 184-195) .
The su'bject of the price for which ewes were
to be killed was introduced to the jury by Mr. Saperstein as follows ( R. 171) :

Q. And just to be certain that you indicated to ·the jury, sir, at what priee did
'they agree to kill sheep for you?
A. Fifty cents per head.
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to
that question as calling for a conclusion. I
think the question should ask wh'at the officers said; I don't think he should ask what
they agreed to.
THE COURT: I think th1a;t 'is correct.
MR. SAPERSTEIN: I think that is
right. I will with·draw ·it and re-state it. What
'did you say to them with re'spect to the price
thart you expected to pay for their slaughtering of the S'heep?
THE WITNESS:
We c'ame to an
a'greed price.
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to
that as bein·g a conclusion. He dan say what
the people said, but not that ·they came to
an agreemen't.
THE COURT: Well, just indicate what
was said.
THE WITNESS: Fifty cents a head
for sheep, plus edibles and in edibles; and three
dollars for cattle, plus inedibles.
6
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MR. SAPERSTEIN: What response
did any of the other gentlemen make to that
proposal of yours?
THE WITNE'SS: 'There was 'a complete
agreement.
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to
that as not being an answer to the question,
and a conclusion, and not a statement of what
they said, 1and I move that it be stricken.
THE COURT: Mr. Hendler, ju·st a
minute. Listen to me and maybe I can help
you.
THE WITNESS: All right.
THE COURT: These lawyers object to
your ·arriving at the conclusion that the jury
is called upon to make. In other words, the
jury is going to determine whether fifity cents
was the amount to be paid, and in order for
you to answer these questions without objection just tell what was said by these people,
and not your conclusion.
THE WITNESS: All right. Ray McFarland who wtas the spokesman f9r the group,
accepted this, and said that would be fine with
them, and the rest of them all either kept
quiet or agreed and accepted it (R. 171-17'2).
On cross examination (R. 182) Mr. Hendler
testified:
Q. Now, as I understand, along in May
of 1961 you had a telephone conversation
with Ray McFarland?
A. Yes.
Q. He, at that time, I think, was presi7
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dent or one of the officers of McFarland, Incorporated?
A. No, I don't know wh1a:t his office
was. He spoke to me as the principal of a
group 'fuat was custom killing at the pl'ant of
McFarland, Incorporated.
Q. Let me 1ask you this : Were you asked
to serve on the Board of Directors of McFarland?
A. No; it was a company that they had
recently formed, a firm called 1a name like
Univers'al Enterprises, or some n!ame rather
similar to that.
Q. Some company that Mr. McFarl1and
was formin'g?
A. Ray McFarland, Mr. Hodson, Mr.
Morgan and Mr. Thayer, I believe.
Q. And this conversation, I think, was
that you were 'to get '10,000 shares of stock
in 'tha t complany to be a director, was it not?
A. And tell them how to run the business.
Q. And tell them how to run the business?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this happened in May of 1961?
A. In ap-proximately th'at time.
Further, Mr. Hendler testified (R. 184):
Q. You are not relying upon a conversa;tion at some other time or pllace other than
in that meeting?
A. No; th1at is the only deal that was
1

8
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made, right in that room. I mean, it is hard
to pinpoint it exactly. I spent a couple of times
there ·but we finally came to the ~agreement
where I said to ~them 1and they said to me and
we had a complete meeting of the minds.

Q.

This was in May of 1961?

A.

Around tlra:t period, yes.

Q. And it was Mr. Ray McFarland who
spoke up 1and said he would kill these ewes
for fifty cents?
A. The group agreed among themselves
and discussed it with me, and I discussed it
with them.

Q. But to answer my inquiry: Which
one person?
A. I don't remember which one of them;
they were all speaking to me at that tln1e;
each one h1ad a little somethin·g to say.
Exhibit 2 was offered and received into evidence over the objection th·a:t it was hearsay and
that no foundation 'h:ad ·been laid to show that the
person who prepared the exhibit had authority to
set prices for H & M Cattle Com·pany (R. 175).
Further, objection was made to the admission of
this exhibit upon the ground tha:t it was immaterial
(R. 177) and the court received this exhibit which
showed an isolated instance of a billing from H &
~I to Goldring Packing Comp·any.
9
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At the conclusion of the plaintiff's presentation of evidence on an oral contract, Jerry Morgan
and Leonard Thayer were calles as witnesses, and
they testified that fuere was no conversation in
M1ay of 1961 with Henry Hendler with regard to
the cost ( R. 214 & R. 245) of the price of killing
sheep, but 'that all conversations occurred in a subsequent meeting in late June or early July just
prior to the prepartation of the written contract (R.
244). Further, they stated they said- they would
not kill ewe's for 50 cents per head, and it was for
tha:t reason that they changed the word, "sheep"
to "l~ambs" before signing the agreement.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the
defendant, Great Western Packing and Cattle Company, moved to dismiss the claim of Goldring Packing Company ·based upon the oral contract upon
the 'ground that as a matter of law, there was no
oral contract (R. 210), and this motion was denied
by the court (R. '212).
To summ1arize who was_ doing what and when,
the following ·diagrams ·are induded in the statement
of facts as a guide.

10
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DIAGRAM A

ATTACK
J{OlJTF~

<>FFEIU>R

#1

ACTION BROUGHT ON WRITTEN CONTRACT
ANI) DEFENDED ON GROU·ND WRITTEN CONTRACT
l)ID NOT COVER KILLING OF EWES

(EXHIBIT #5)

OFFEREE

Written Contract
H. & M. ·Cattle Co.
Included killing of beef &
M·ORGAN'S &
lambs
H. & M refused to
PACKING CO.
HODSONS
sign until word "sheep"
+_.I changed to "lamb" & Gold- 1+--+
IIENRY HENDLER
Started Operating
ring required guarantors
Plant in July of
( l\ianage1·)
by way of supplemental
1961
agreement.
Contract dated August 18,
1961 but negotiated in July
of 1961 at S'LC.
<;OLI>RING

Great
Western
Assumed
Liability
contained
~

GREAT WESTERN
PACKING AND
CATTLE COMPANY
~

in Exhibit
#'5

Began Operating
Plant on August
4, 1961

DEFENSE WAS SUCCESSFUL AS PLAIN'TIFF ADMITTED A EWE WAS NOT A LAMB AND AT
PRE-TRIAL JUDGE RULED ORAL EVIDENCE W0 ULD N·O'T BE A'LLOWED TO MODIFY WRITTEN
AGREEMENT TO CHAN·GE WORD "LAM~B" TO WORD "'SHEE~P."
1
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DIAGRAM B

DEFENSE
ROUTE #2

GREAT WESTERN PA·CKING & CATTLE CO. CLAIMED IT WAS
ENTITLE·D TO RECOVER THE FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE
OF ITS SERVICES IN KILLING 'THE EWES,

GREAT WESTERN PACKING I
AND CATTLE COMPANY

DEFENSE NOT CONSIDERED AS JURY FOU·ND
CENTS PER HEAD.

I

GOLDRING PACKING CO.
Mr. Hendler

OR-~L

CONTRACT TO !{ILL EWES FOR FIFTY
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IJIAGRAM C

ATTACK
HO liTE

;;:~

AT PRE-TRIAL TWENTY-SIX MONTHS AFTER FILING
OF COMPLAINT PLAINTIFF INTRODUCED FOR FIRST
TIME CLAIM OF ORAL CONTRACT

BIL·LINGS FROM H. & 1\I.

EXHIBIT #2

Office Manager
mistakenly billed a fe\v
ewes or sheep at
price of lambs and
offered to prove
truth of oral contract

Admitted over
objection it
was Hearsay
Mr. Couch not called.

w

July
OFFEREE

OFFEROR
GOLDRING
PACKING CO.
MR. I-IENRY
I-I ENDLER
(Manager)

1~._61

THE GRO(U'P
OFFER MA'DE
I'N CONVERSATI·ON OF.......
·M:A Y 1961 --,

Leonard Thayer
Ray McFarland
McFarland Packing Co
Mink, Inc.
·
Ralston Purina
Vance Hodson
Wayne Hodson
Jerry ·Morgan
Roy Morgan
H. & M. Cattle Co.

l

H. & M. CATTLE CO.

GREAT WESTERN PACKING
AND CATTLE CO.

Started Operation
of Plant
in July 1961

STARTE·D OPERATION
OF PLANT
AUGU·ST 4, 1961

DEFENSE OF NO Sponsored
ORALbyCONTRA·CT
F AJlLE·D WHEN JURY FOUND o·FFER MADE TO GRO·UP
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library
Services
Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
WAS ACCEPTED BY H. & M. ·CATTLEand COMPANY.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The attached diagram shows that the original
offer went from the offeror, Goldring Packing Company, in an oral conversation in May of 1961 to
the offeree, the Group in May of 1961. The written
agreement, EXhibit 5, is important because it shows
th'at a new and different offer in writing was made
to H & M C!attle Company and that this new offer
whi~h was accepted required in !addition to other
terms, guarantors from H & M Cattle Company.
Following the admission of Exhibit 2, Mr.
Couch, the party who prepared the billing to Goldring Packin·g Company, was called as a witness~
and he testified thlat he had no knowledge of the
contract price between H & M ·Ca:ttle Company and
Goldrin·g for the killing of ewes at 50 cents per
head, and further said that he charged this amount
because ·he needed money to meet the payroll and
keep the doors open, and knew 1at le'ast that much
would be allowed, since they got that price for lambs.
(R. 25 2-257).
1

The Great Western Packing and Cattle Company contended that the fair and reasonable value
of their services in killing each of the 8,151 ewes
was $3.00 per head. To support this contention, they
called as witnesses Abe Guss of the Granite Meat
& Livestock Company, Fred Pickren of the Midvale
Packing Com·pany, and Irvin Guss of the Jordan
Meat & Livestock Company, all of which testified
that they h·ad been in the business for many years
and that the fair and reason·able value of the service
14
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in killing a ewe was $3.00 or more. Mr. Hendler,
in rebuttal, testified that an excellent profit could
be made for killing them ~at 50 cents each. However,
thi~ ~testimony was not considered by 'the jury, along
with other testimony respecting the fair ·an·d reasonable value of the services in killing the sheep, because they answered the interrogatory (R. 130)
saying there was an oral contract to kill the ewes
for 50 cents per head.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW NO ORAL CONTRAIC'T
\VAS MADE, AS AN OFFER CAN ONLY BE .A:CCE'PTED BY THE OFFEREE.

Great Western Packing ·and Cattle Company
contends, since H & M Cattle Company was rwt the
Group operating the plant in May, 1961, H & M
Cattle Company received no oral offer to kill any
e\ves for Goldring Packing ~Company for 50 cents
per head and did not ·accept any alleged offer.
In May of 1961 in the conference room at the
McFarland plant, Hank Hendler, the General Manager of Goldring Packing Company, made an oral
offer to the McFarland Packing Company or the
Group operating the McFarland plant.
At the time this oral offer was alleged to be
made, Jerry Morgan, Roy Morgan, 1an·d Wayne Hodson of the H & M Cattle Company were present,
15
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and allegedly heard the offer to the Group an·d remained silent.
'Thereafter, in July of 1961 H & M Cattle
Company argues that by taking over the oper1a:tivn
of the plant the oral offer in May was accepted by
H & M Cattle Company and that all ewes killed in
July, August, and September of 196~ were killed
pursuant to 1an acceptance of the oral offer made to
the Group in May of t961.
Great Western Packing and Cattle Company
claims the only person or party who could have accepted the offer of Mr. Hendler in May was the
Group op·erating the plant to whom 'the offer was
made.
The Restatement of the Law of Contr1acts, Section 54, page 60 reads: "A revocable offer can be
accepted only by or for the benefit of the person
to whom it is made."
In Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. Sec. 80, it
is stated:
"One of the necessary or essential elements of 'any proposed contract is 'the person
with whom the contract is made. Accordingly,
~an offer made to one person cannot be accepted by another, even though the offeree purports to assign it. Nor does it make any difference whether it was important for the
offeror to contract with one person rather
than another * * *."
In Paige vs. Faure (1920) 229 N.Y. 114, 127
N.E. 898, it was held an option given a partnership
16
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of two, one of whom thereafter assigned to the
other, could not be exercised by the remaining partners, exercise of an acceptance of the option.
In Dorsey vs. Strand (1944) 21 Was'h. 2d 217,
150 P. 2d 702, where a member of a committee selected to charter a plane endeavored to accept, the
court held as a m!atter of law there was no a'cceptance of an offer, saying when an offer is made, it
can be accepted only by the offeree, an·d if acceptance is to be man'ifested by doing of ·an act, such
act must be done by the offeree or there is no contt~act.

In Gates vs. Petri ( 1H57) 127 Ind. App. Ct.
Rep. 670, 14·3 N.E. 293 where the record showed
that the wife of the appellant G~ates did not sign the
acceptance of the offer or proposition, and there
was no evidenc that Bernard T. Gates was the agent
of or authorized to sign for his wife, the court said
an offer can be accepted only by the offeree, and
that to constitute a valid contract, the minds of
the parties must have met on the identities of the
person with whom they are dealing. In the case
at bar, the offeror's proposition Wlas to the owners
of the real estate described, and as both owners did
not accept, an agreemen't did not occur. The court
said the acceptance must meet and correspond with
the offer in every respect, neither falling by or going beyond the terms proposed, but exactly meeting
\vith them on all points.
17
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In Routzahn vs. Cromer (1959) 220 Md. 65,
150 Atl: 2d 912, where the name of a purchaser was
substituted after vendors agreed to sell and the
change in purchaser was agreed to only by the husband seller, the court held the 'acceptance was unenforcible, saying that one of the necessary terms of
any contract is the name of the person with whom
it is made, and that consequently, an offer made
to one cannot be accepted by another. Further, the
court said a p·arty has a right to contract with whom
he pleases and that another cannot be thrust upon
him without his consent.
In Denver Truck Exchange vs. Perryman
( 1957) 134 Colo. 586, 307 P. 2d 805, the court followed the general rule saying 1an offer can be accepted only by the one to whom rt is m·ade and 'that
an offer made to Estlinbaum could only be accepted
by him, and not Perryman.
In Schneider vs. Pioneer Trust and Savings
Bank (1960) 26 Ill. App. 2d 463, 168 N.E. 2d 808,
where the plaintiffs offered to purch1ase real estate
from trustee of Bank, who was trustee for William
Harmon, a sole beneficiary, and the beneficiary,
Harmon, attempted to accept the offer as the owner,
and where at 1all times trustee of Bank was unaware
of negotiations, the court held that under the terms
of the offer only the Trustee Bank could accept the
offer and that as Bank did not, there was never a
valid contract. The court said merely because Harmon had power to bring about the result contem18
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plated in the offer does not constitute him an offeree,
and that to constitute a contract by offer !and acceptance, the acceptance must conform exactly to the
offer.
In Dar·u vs. Ill artin ( 1961) 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.
2d 61, where an offer was made to one Emanuel A.
Perry but instead an attorney by the name of Daru
endeavored to accept rt, the court held he could not
legally accept, saying :
"When an offer is m·ade to ·a particular
person or persons, the law is clear that no
one else can accept the offer and it is not
transferable to another. 13 C.J.S. 273 Contracts, Section 69, f7 ·C.J.S. Con'tr~acts, Section 40, Citing Cases. Neither is there any ambigtlity in the offer which woul'd a1low any
interpretation making plaintiff an offeree.
The offer was made to Emanuel A. Perry, in
care of Robert Daru (p~aintiff). This wording definitely excludes plaintiff as a con'tracting party. Therefore, any ·attempted acceptance of vendor's offer by plaintiff as a principal, either individu1ally or with others, had
no legal effect in binding vendor to a contract.
In R. J. Dattm Construction Co. vs. Child ( 1'952)
122 Utah 194, '247 P. 2d ·817, and in Williams vs.
Espey (1961) 11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P. 2d 903, this
court stated an offer must be unconditionally accepted, saying to hold otherwise would m'ake ·a contract where there was no meeting of the min·ds.
1

As the plaintiff did not prove or offer to prove
an oral offer to H & M Cattle Company, it is sub19
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mitted that as a matter of law H & M Cattle Company was not an offeree, and that under the facts
of this case, there is no oral contract. Further, it is
submitted that only the Group to whom the alleged
oral offer of Mr. Hendler was m ade could accept
to constitute an oral contract and a meetin·g of the
minds.
1

POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF ·LAW THE NEGOTIATIONS
SHIOW THE p A'R'TIES REJE'CTED THE ALLEGED
MAY, 1961 ORA!L O·FFER.

Great Western Packin·g and Cattle Company
contends, as a m!a'tter of law, the complaint, stating
an action upon a written contract, the Pretrial
Order ·and Exhibit ·5 show 'the parties did not make
an oral contract in May, 1961. A:t the pretriJal for
the first time, the plaintiff contended it had a cause
of ·action upon an oral contract. Until then its theory
of recovery was based upon 'a written contract or
upon a dispute as to wha;t was the fair and reasonable value of the service of H & M Cattle Company
in killing the ewes in question.
The written agreement of August, 1961 is a
rejection of any oral offer of May of that year.
Since 'the Goldring Packing Company had its
attorneys prepare the written agreement of August, 1961 and its president signed and 1accepted the
change in the agreement showing that it covered
merely the killing of lambs and not ewes, i't is undisputed that a new and different offer was com20
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tnunicated to the H & M Cattle Company thran had
been given originally to the Group operating McFarlands in May.
In the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
Section 41, page 49, it is provided:
"Revocation of an offer may be made by
a comtnunication from offeror received by
offeree ,which states or implies ·that the offeror no longer intends to enter into proposed
contract, if the communication is received by
the offeree before he has exercised his power
of creating a contract by acceptance of the
offer."
As the written offer and agreement made between Goldring Packing Company and H & M Cattle
Company required as an ·additional condition of H
& M C1attle Company to m·aking an agreement th'at
it get the personal indemnity of the various indemnitors, it appears that an additional condition was
attached to making a deal with H & M Cattle Company than what was attached to making a. deal or
agreement with the Group operat'ing McF·arlands
in May, 1961.
Further, it would apear that the refusal of H
& M Cattle Company to sign the written agreement
to kill ewes or sheep for 50 cents per head would
haYe been a communication of a rejection to the oral
proposal in May, 1961, and such a rejection would
have destroyed the original May offer as a matter
of law.
In Hargrave vs. Heard Investment Co. (1940)
21
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56 Ariz. 77, 105 P. 2d 520, the court held when one
with whom another offers to enter into a contract
on certain terms declines to 1accept such terms, but
offers a counter proposition, then the original offer
loses i!ts effect and may thereafter be accepted by
the offeree only when renewed by the offeror.
It is submitted that the refusal to sign the written agreement to kill sheep for 50 cents per head
was a rejection of the May offer, 1as this agreement
was signed in August after being discussed in June
and July, and constituted a rejection as a matter of
law, and that thereafter, as a matter of law, there is
no evidence to show the offer was ever orally renewed.
As a general rule, parties are not continued to
negotiate and bargain and then insist th1at original
offer remains open for acceptance.
In Drennan vs. Star Paving Company (1958)
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P. 2d 757, the Supreme Court of
California held a general contractor could not reopen bargaining with a subcontractor and at the
same time continue a right to accept the original
offer of the subcontractor. The California court
said:
"It bears noting that a general contractor is not free to ·delay acceptance after he has
·been awarded the general contract in hope of
getting a better price. Nor can he reopen
bargaining with the subcontractor and at the
same time claim a continuing right to accept
22
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the original offer. See R. J. Daum Construction Co. vs. Child, Utah, 24 7 P. 2d 817, 823,

* * *."

In order to convert an offer into a conti'Iact,
there must be an acceptance of the offer before it is
withdrawn. Continued existence of an offer until
accepted is necessary to make possible the formation of a contract. Further, in Drennan vs. StJar
Pa·vi-ng Company, Supra, the California court said
that if knowledge of facts inconsistent with the continuance of the offer is brought ·home to the offeree,
the offer cannot be accepted.
In Hoover Motor Express Company, Inc. vs.
Clements Paper Company, ( 19'51) 193 Tenn. 6, ·241
S.W. 2d 851, where prior to acceptance of a written
offer, the offeror, by telephone, told the ·offeree
that 'he didn't think ·he woul'd be going through with
the proposal and that he had other plans in mind,
the court held the offeree had knowled'ge the offer
was withdrawn 1and was no longer continuing, and
an attempted acceptance hereafter was ineffective
to form a binding contract.
The continued bargaining between Goldring
Packing Company 'and H & M Cattle Company in
July and August of 1961 shows as a matter of law
the May offer, even if it could be construed to be
made to H & M Cattle Company as an offeree, was
not open for 'acceptance. It is submitted that since
the memorandum agreement of August, 1961 (Exhibit 5) s·hows Goldring was bargaining in July and
23
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August for a written agreement containing the additional conditions as follows,
1. To make H & M Cattle Company its agent
to purchase cattle for Goldring.
2. To make H & M Cattle Company obligated to slaughter cattle for $3.00 per head.
3. To make H & M Cattle Company sell beef
for Goldring.
4. To m1ake H & M Cattle Company guarantee certain beef prices as provided weekly by
Goldring to H & M Cattle Company.
5. To make H & M Ca:ttle Company hold
Goldring Packing Company harmless from all
claims of every nature.
6. To provide that H & M C~attle Company
furnis·h fire and extended coverage insurance
to Goldring Packing Company.
7. To make H & M Cattle Company provide
indemnitors to guarantee its ability to perform with Goldring,
that as a matter of law, the dealings of the parties
after May, 1961 s·how a rejection of the May offer
by both parties concerned, and there was no meeting of the minds on any oral agreement. Definitely,
the future dealings of the parties in July and August show the oral offer of May, 1961 was not un ..
conditionally accepted.
From the conduct of the parties, it is obvious
that if anything, the May oral offer was a preliminary offer only, and that thereafter, it was not
seriously considered by Goldring Packing Company
24
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or H & M Cattle Company until it was definitely
learned at the time of the Pretrial a ewe could not
be construed to be a lamb.
POINT III.
THE CONDU'CT OR 8ILE·NCE OF H & M CATTLE
COMPANY, OR ITS OFFICERS, AT THE MAY, 1961
CONFEREN·CE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DID NOT
MAKE AN ORAL CONTRACT.

N'O where in his testimony did IMr. Hendler say
the H & M Cattle Company or a.ny one of its representatives said they would kill sheep or ewes for 50
cents a head. He did, however, imply H & M C·attle
Company accepted his offer to the Group because
the officers of H & M Cattle Company were present
when he made the offer to the Group.
In this appeal H & M Cattle ·Company con'tends
that since an oral offer was not made to it as offeree,
the silence or conduct of its officers at the ~eeting
in May of 1961 did not constitute an accep'tance of
an oral offer.
In 17 C.J. S. Con tvacts, Section 41, it is stated
that as a general rule silence does not constitute an
acceptance of an offer. In 17 C.J.S. Contrac'ts, Section 41, it is provided:
~'As

a general rule, mere silen·ce does not
constitute an acceptance of an offer. Silence
alone does not give consent, even by estoppel,
since there must not only be the right, but
the duty, to speak before the failure to do
so can estop a person afterward to set up the
:25
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truth, particularly where the silence or inaction has an uncertain or ambiguous meaning and the parties have reasoniable differing
views as to what the fact meant. It is otherwise if the relationship of the parties, their
previous dealings, or other circumstances are
such as to impose a duty to speak; and, if
in such a case the offeree is silent or his inaction conveys but one reasonable meaning,
intentional assent on his part is not a requisite.
"An offer made to another, either orally
or in writing, cannot be turned into an agreement merely because the person to whom it is
m·ade or sent makes no reply, even though the
offer states that silence will be taken as consent, for the offeror cannot prescribe the conditions of the rejection so as to turn silence
on the part of the offeree into an acceptance,
unless the offeree has previously agreed that
silence shall be so construed. Thus, it has
been said tha:t silence will not amount to the
:acceptance of an offer unless it is expressly
so agreed.
"In like manner, mere delay in accepting
or rejecting an offer cannot make an agreement, unless the circumstances :are such as to
impose a duty to reply."
It is su;bmitted, as a m·atter of law, since the
offer was made to ·~he Group, an·d not to H & M
Cattle Company, that its officers, although members
of the Group, had no duty to speak up or affirmatively reject the offer.
In Suitter vs. Thompson (1960) 2'25 Ore. 614,
26
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:358 P. 2d 267, where the plaintiff was silent when
one of the defendants made an offer to pay plaintiff
for his interest in a mine, 1/20th of interest of the
defendants in royalties from mine for a period of
five years, the court held silence did not constitute
an acceptance where there was no showing of any
right to demand some action by the plaintiff, even
though plainti'ff received and accepted a check. Further, the court said in Suitter vs. Thompson, Supra.
an acceptan~ce of an offer ;by silence can only arise
when circumstances existing are such th·at a ·duty
arises requiring the offeree to speak, and ·a duty
to speak can only arise when offeror has a right to
demand some action on the part of the offeree.

What right did Goldring P·acking Comp·any
haYe to dem:and of H & M C·a:ttle ~complany after
the May conference that it kill ·ewes for '50 cents
per head?
It would appear that since it had no right to
demand from H & M Cattle ·Comp·any that it kill
ewes for 50 cents a head, there would be no duty
to spe·ak on the part of H & M Cattle Company.
In llfacy vs. Day (1961) Mo. App., 346 S.W.
2d 555, the court held to make a valid contract, the
parties must have a distinct intention, common to
both, and without doubt in difference, and their
minds must meet upon the assent to the same thing
in the same sense at the same time.
It is submitted that since H & M Cattle Com27
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pany was not operating the plant in May that the
intention of its officers to assent to the offer of Mr.
Hendler did not occur.
In Kimball Elevator Company vs. Elevator Supplies Company (1954) 2 Utah 2d 289, 272 P. 2d
583, where :an a~tion was brought for bre·ach of an
alleged agreement not to compete in bidding, and
where the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
and where both parties had been in the business for
years, and where it had been the practice of Kimball to subcontract from Elevator Supplies Company,
and w·here in the past, Kim~ba1l had accepted Elevator Supplies Company's bid, and where Kimball's
man'ager requested a sub-bid from Elevator Supplies Company for modernizin'g elevators at the
Hotel Utah, an·d bid was furnished, and where thereafter, the Hotel Utah requested a bid ·directly from
Elevator Supplies Company, and thereafter that bid
was accepted, and where after, when the plaintiff
did not get job, it claimed first that Elevator Supplies Company owed 'it ia commission for helping it
get the job, and second, that when this was rejected,
it had a cause of action for breach of an implied
agreement not to compete, and where witness for
the plaintiff said it was his impression that second
bid was check bid only and would be higher, naturally, as it was out of San Francisco, and where this
testimony was objected to as an impression rather
than a fact, and where the court said the testimony
was improperly ;admitted because the witness was

·''

',

....
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giving impressions, not fact, and where this court
said:
"Even if this testimony had been elicited
in such a manner to be competent, that is a
statement made by Roy Smith, at best it would
have shown only that he knew that the plaintiff wanted Elevator Supplies to make a check
bid, but would have fallen far short of
amounting to a promise that his Company
would do so.
"l't is of course conceded that ·a contract
may be made out even though there be no express words formally stating it, 1and tha:t the
promise may be inferred wholly or in part
from such conduct as justifies the promisee in
understanding that the promisor intended to
make it. Nevertheless we fail to see how, taking all of the evidence and every reasonable
inference th:at m·ay fairly be derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the ·plain'tiff, as we are obliged to do, a findin·g that
Elevator Supplies made suc~h promise in the
instant case can be supported. Likewise, we
find no circumstances here from which it
could be reason:ably concluded th·at silence or
inaction with respect to such request amounted to an acceptance."
I't appears fuat the testimony of Mr. Hendler
in May of 1961 merely shows 'that his Company
wanted sheep killed for 50 cents per head 1and that
the action or inaction on the part of the H & M
Cattle Company officers at the meeting fell far short
of amounting to a promise to kill sheep, even thou·gh
he was under the impression they agreed, as iafter
all, the test of a true interpretation of an accept29
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ance is not what a party making it thought it meant
or intended it to mean, but what reasonable persons
in the position of the parties would have thought it
meant, Ray vs. William G. Eurice & Brothers ( 1952)
201 Md. 115, 93 Atl. 2d 2'7·2.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED PREJUDICALLY IN
A:DMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

The truth of the statement that Goldring Packing ·Company was asserting at the trial was that
in May of 1961 it made ·an oral contract with H & M
Cattle Company to kill ewes for 50 cents per head.
Goldring Packing Company's direct oral evidence s·howed an oral agreement was made with the
Group operatin·g McFarland's plant, but showed no
direct oral agreement with H & M Cattle Company.
To bridge the gap between the Group operating the
plant and H & M Cattle Company, Goldring Packing Company offered, and the Lower Court received,
Exhibit 2. ·This exhibit consisted of seven billings
from H & M Cattle Company to Goldring Packing
Company in whi·ch it billed a few ewes or sheep at
50 cents per head.
The defendant, Great Western Packing and
Cattle Company, objected to this exhibit being received by the Lower Court on the ground the exhibit was hearsay to prove the truth of an oral contract ma·de in May of 1961, but the exhibit was received by the Lower Court over Great Western Packing and C·attle Company's objection. Thereafter,
30
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plaintiff's counsel used the exhibit to argue that
if a few ewes or sheep were billed out at 50 cents
·a head, it certainly was true that there was an oral
contract made in May.
Mr. Dennis W. Couch, the man who prepared
the billings in Exhibit 2, was available as a witness,
and after the admittance of Exhibit 2, he was called
and testified .that he was employed during July,
August and September at the McFarland Plant, receiving his pay check from McFarlan·d's, and that
he was employed as an office man·ager an'd collections manager, and that he prepared the second,
third, fourth, and fifth billings of the seven billings
in Exhibit 2. He said that h·e had billed the sheep
out at 50 cents only be·cause he knew ·fuat was the
figure he was going to get, and that he needed
money, as they were short on ·working capital to
meet the payroll. Further, he testified th!at he 'had
not received any specific instructions to bill ewes
at 50 cents a head, but knew this was the sum they
were getting for lambs, and then on ·his own, with~
out any authorization, he billed a few ewes at 50
cents, saying he knew they would ·be ~llowe'd at 50
cents a head but did not know how much more on
the ewes. He also said that ·he knew there had to be
a difference in the price between killing ewes and
lambs, but that he did not know whether or not
there was a contract covering the killing of ewes,
but that 'he did know there was a contract for the
killing of lambs at 50 cents per head.
31
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In th·e Handbook of the Law of Evidence by
Charles T. McCormick at p!age 460, hearsay evidence is defined as follows:
"With these warnings, the following
is proposed. Hearsay evidence is testimony in
court or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, such evidence being offered as an assertion to show the truth of
matters !asserted therein, and thus resting
for its value upon the credibility of the out
of court asserter. ''
T he principal reason for excluding hearsay is
namely, the want of the right of confrontation in
cross examination to· ~determine the credibility of
the out of court declarant.
1

In. this particular case, if Mr. Saperstein had
had to produce Mr. Couch as his witness and on
cross examin!ation it had been shown that he did
not know of any oral contract to kill ewes for fifty
cents, his credibility as to the price would have
made his testimony valueless.

Of course, if the billings h·ad been offered to
prove a written agreement in July to kill ewes for
50 cents, no one would contend that would be hearsay to prove a written :agreement.
There are many instances of the exclusion of
written statements as hearsay when offered in court
as eviden'ce of the truth of an asserted fact.
In Heil vs. Zahn (1947) 187 Md. 603, 51 Atl.
2d 174, where a suit was brought by a nurse against
32
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a decedent's estate for services, the decedent's written di1·ections to his executors stating that he owed
no debts was excluded as hearsay:
Doctors written medical reports on their findings as to treatment and examinations !are generally held to be hearsay, and in Dier vs. Dier (1942)
141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W. 2d 7·31, where in a divorce
suit the report of an investigator, acting at the request of the court pursuant to statute, of interviews
with parties, report was us·ed, and circumstances
where the party ~ffering the repqrt offered 'to produce for cross ex-amination the investigator and the
persons interviewed, tll·e court held, nevertheless,
the use of the report was hearsay and error.
In R1tssell vs. Ogden Union Railway & Depot
Company (1952) 122 Utah 107, 24 7 P. 2d 257,
\Vhere an action· WaS brough't by an employee for
alleged 'vrongful discharge by the Railroad, and
where the employee's statement contained in the
transcript given in the ·hearing :before the Railway's
~ssistant superintendent a statement that the employee had been too sick to apply for leave of absence, it was held that the use of the report was
hearsay :and ina-dmissable as proof of illness.
In Montana in Shillingstad vs. Nelson (1963)
141 )font. 412, 378 P. 2d 393, where the court at the
request of plaintiff's counsel admitted a written
n1edical report of an examination made by defendant's doctor over objection, the court held ~admission
of the medical report was hearsay and not within
1
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the rule of an· exception to the hears·ay rule, and that
it was preju'dicial error to admit the report where the
doctor was not called as a witness.
In Gifford vs. York (1950) 14·5 Me. 397, 74
Atl. 2d 878, Where the court excluded a receipt given
by a third party purporting to cover a commission
for sale of property, the court held excluding 'tfue receipt was not error because it was hearsay, particularly where 'the party giving the receipt was in the
courtroom !an\d not called as a witness.
In the principal ·case, Mr. Couch was available
as a witness.
In Hunter vs. Totman (1951) 146 Me. 259, 80
Atl. 2d 401, where the court refused to admit inventory notebook in a case where the seller sued the
buyer of pota:toes and where seller's claim was based
on inventory in notebook kept by a person who had
no personal knowledge of number of barrels of potatoes from seeing either slips or tickets, the court
held it was reversible error to admit the inadmissible notebook, and in granting a new trial said :
"'Our court has decided that where the
entries in a book of accounts do not itemize
the transactions recorded, an'd comprise the
details of several trans·actions, the book is not
·:admissible as independent evidence. Putman
vs. Grant, 101 Me. 240, 63 Atl. 816. Statements of the plaintiff himself or of third persons, such as invoices, bills of lading or protests, are not admissible. Paine vs. Maine
Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 6'9 Me. 568."
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In Nalder vs. Kellogg Sales Co. (1957) 6 Utah
2d 367, 314 I). 2d 350, where trial court admitted
profit and loss statements, this court reversed the
trial court for committing prejudicial error saying
the exhibit was not shown to have been prepared,
nor was it presented by a person competent to do
so who was subject to cross-examination; nor was
it based on records or other data available for examination, other than the exhibit herein mentioned.
Further, in N.alder vs. K.ellog Sales Co., Supra., the
court said the correct rule was stated in Sprague
vs. Boyles Brothers Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, a;t
page '3'5'2, 294 P. 2d 689 at page 694.
1

In Sprague vs. Boyles Brothers Drilling Co.
(1956) 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P. 2d 68'9, the court said
regarding admission of numerous work sheets:
''It has been held, and we believe the ruling to be a salutary and expe!dien't one, th~at
where origin·al book entries, documents, or
other data ~are so numerous, complex or cumbersome that they cannot be conveniently examined by the trier of fact, or where it would
materially aid the court and p·arties in analyzing such material, that !a competent person who has made suC'h examination may present such evidence. This is subject to ·~he limitation that the evidence must be shown to be
developed from records, ·books or documents,
the competency of which has been established,
and the records must be available for exainination by the opposing parties and the witnesses subject to cross examination concerning such evidence."
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In the principal case it is submitted, since Mr.
Couch admitted he had no knowl'edge of an oral
contract to kill ewes or sheep for 50 cents per he:ad,
that any evidence contained in fue billings was not
developed from a competent source, and that as a
matter of law, the billings should have been excluded.
Further, since 'Mr. Couch testified he didn't know
the terms of the contract or if there was a contract
for k~lling ewes ( R. 258) and said he never received. any specific instructions about killing ewes
or billing for killing ewes ( R. ·254), an'd did not
know of the ·arrangements between the parties for
k:illing ewes, it would appear that the billings in
Exhibit 2 were no't written within fue scope of his
authority to speak or write for H & M C!attle ·Company, and it is submitted they were not admissible
as ·admissions of a representative n·ature.
In John C. Cutler Association vs. De Jay Store.f)
(195'5) 3 Utah 2d 107, 279 P. 2d 700, where an
objeetion was made on the ground the !answer would
be ·hearsay when a witness was asked what was the
amount of the bid, this court sustained the exclusion· of -the testimony as hearsay, since ifuere was no
proper foundation for its admission.
1

POINT V.
THE ·C·ON·CLUSION OF A WITNESS IS NOT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE AN ORAL CONTRA·CT.

To prove the oral contract Mr. Saperstein, the
attorney for Goldring Packing Company, did not
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ask Mr. Hendler what he said or what was said
oo him by officers or employees of H & M Cattle
Company. Rather, he 'asked for Mr. Hendler's conclusion as to what the agreed price was and a proper
objection was made ( R. 171). Repeatedly, Mr.
Hendler tried to testify they agreed or there was
a complete agreement, but he never did state wh:at
\Vas said. In fact, Mr. Hendler said Mr. McFarland,
Who was not an officer or employee of the H & M
Cattle Company engaged to make contr~acts, did most
of the talking and that they accepted individually
and collectively, and said he could not specifically say
that Mr. Morgan said yes, and the others did not S'ay
anything, saying that he did not know. Whenever
1\'lr. Hendler was asked a question :about what was
said as to the price, he would just say 'that they
agreed among themselves, ·giving ·his conclusion.
The only individuals Mr. Hendler recalled saying
anything to him on the price were Mr. Leonard
Thayer, the president of McFarlands Incorporated
at the time of the conference. in May, and Mr. Ray
McFarland, another officer of iMcFarlands. With
regard to Mr. Jerry Morgan, this question was asked
(R. 188).
Q. You don't recall specifically of Mr. Jerry
Morgan saying he would kill these for fifty
cents?
. .\. No, I can not remember that far back so
far as the individuals are concerned.
In this appeal the Great Western Packing and
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Oattle Company contends the testimony of Mr. Hendler merely showed his state of mind or conclusion,
and '~hat it was not competent to prove an oral contract because he a·dmitted he did not know what
Jerry Morgan or any other representative of the
H & M Cattle ·Comp:any said about the price for
killing ewes.
It was quite evident at the trial when Mr. Saperstein abruptly changed the subject of conversation from over-time kill on Saturd·ay to the agreed
price for killing sheep, that he wanted to get a conclusion out of 'Mr. Hendler before a timely objection could b·e m:ade by defendant's counsel (R. 174).
The question sta~ting at the top of page R. 174 was
like this:
Q. Belonged to the Goldring Packing Company, is that corre'Ct?
A. That is correct; and we sold them locally
here to a compiany called Summerhays.
Q. Was there any conversation at this time
with respect to any charges for overtime kill
or Saturday kill?
A. Not at that time.
And now comes the quick question asking for a conclusion:
Q. And just to be cetrain that you indicated
to the jury, sir, iat what price did they agree
to kill sheep for you?
And a very quick answer :
A. Fifty cents per head.
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to that
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question as calling for a conclusion. I think
the question should ask what the officers said;
I don't think he should ·ask what they agreed
to.
Further, the record shows that he always said
there was an agreement or they agreed, and never
said what, and of course, each time I objected, the
jury felt I was being unfair in not letting Mr. Hendler give his con'clusion or state of mind, and it is
submitted the jury is ~always prejudiced against the
objector because it does not understand the reasoning behind the taking of the objection, and does
not realize that as a matter of law on appeal you
will lose on the record if you don't take the objection,
and merely thinks, "Th1at lawyer has got something
to hide, so let's not let him do it."
In Kimball Elevator Company vs. Elevator Supplies Company (1954) 2 Utah 2'd 289, ·2·72 P. 2d
583, where the witness for the plaintiff testified
that it was his im~pression second bid was c-heck
bid only, and an objection was taken as to his conclusion or impression, as it was called, our cou:rt
said the witness' testim·ony was improperly admitted because the witness was giving an impression
and not a fact ,and that the testimony was not elicited in a competent manner.
In Dansak vs. Delttke ( 1961) 12 Utah 2d 302,
366 P. 2d 67, where proper testimony was objected
to upon the ground that it would be hearsay, and
'vhere the offer of proof was as follows:
"Mr. Pace, I \vill state that Mr. Kenyon
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will testify. He had examined and satisfied
himself in talking to the men in this corporation they were transferring all of their legal
obligations of Mr. Lewis Deluke for Lucy
Deluke, signing 'her property to the corporation, and he advised there was no problem in
the transaction, and he advised his client to
go ahead with this agreement."
This court said the proper proof was properly excluded, as it merely showed a state of mind and did
not definitely state the facts sought to be proved.
It is proposed that the testimony of Mr. Hendler was not elicited in a competent manner to prove
an oral contract, and that no or~al contract was
proven because he failed to state facts showing Mr.
Jerry Morgan or any other in.dividual representing
H & M Cattle Company would kill ewes for 50
cents !a head.
CON'CLUSION
The judgment of the Lower Court should be
reversed and a new trial should be granted solely
upon the issue of what was the reasonable value
of the service of Great Western Packing and Cattle
Company in killing the ewes for Goldring Packing
Company.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for Dejendant-AppelZant
Great Western Packing &
Cattle Co.
203 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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I hereby certify that on this ---------------- day of
......... ·-··-···-·-·---------------, 1964, I mailed two copies of
this Brief by United States mail, postage prepaid,
to Herschel J. Saperstein, Louis M. Haynie, and
Barker and Ryberg, Attorneys at Law, at the addresses shown on the cover of this Brief.
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